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Abstract 
In this thesis, the effects of ownership structure on the patent applications of 
start-up  firms  are  examined,  focusing  particularly  on  the  role  of  VC.  A  unique 
dataset of Japanese start-up firms is used in the analysis, controlling for firm and 
industry  characteristics.  We  find  that  shareholding  by  VC  has  a  positively 
significant impact on patent applications and VC is supposed to have an increasing 
effect on patent applications of the firms brought by R&D expenditures.   
 
                                                   
* I am deeply indebted to my doctoral dissertation advisers, Professors Hiroyuki Okamuro and Sadao 
Nagaoka, for their counsel and guidance.   3 
1.  Introduction   
 
In  Japan,  start-up  firms  that  produce  new  technologies  and  services  are 
increasingly regarded as the means by which Japanese economy can be revived. 
Acs  and  Audretsch  (1987)  suggest that while  large  firms tend to  have  the 
relative innovative advantage in industries that are capital-intensive, concentrat- 
ed  and  advertising-intensive,  small  firms  tend  to  have  this  advantage  in  high 
technologies industries. Moreover, they indicate that large firms have the relative 
innovative  advantage  in  markets  characterized  by  imperfect  competition,  small 
firms have it in markets more closely approximating the competitive model.   
Previous studies primarily concentrate on the patents of large, mature firms. 
However, few studies conduct on the patents held by small firms, and there is little 
information  on  the  patents  application  of start-up firms. Over  the recent  years, 
start-up firms are increasingly regarded as the promoters of innovation. Therefore, 
it  is  crucial  to  examine  the  factors  that  promote  patent  application  by  start-up 
firms.   
The  following  are  a  few  previous  studies  that  examine  the  innovation  of 
start-up firms. Itou and Akashi (2005) analyze the determinants of R&D output and 
technical guidance by outside research organizations such as universities as well as 
the effect of R&D subsidy using a large sample of Japanese start-up firms. With 
regard to patent application, Kortum and Lerner (2000) demonstrate that venture 
capitalists (VC)-backed firms are more innovative than non-VC-backed firms, prior 
to VC funding. Lynskey (2004) find positive and significant impact of VC funding on   4 
the number of patent applications and new productions using the data of Japanese 
start-up firms, while Hellmann and Puri (2000) observe that VC select firms with 
higher innovative output and more educationally qualified management to fund.   
Yet, there is few previous study conducted on the effects of ownership structure 
on the patent applications of Japanese start-up firms. And, there is not any study 
that show whether shareholding by VC is supposed to have a positive effect on the 
patent applications of start-up firms brought by R&D expenditures.   
In this thesis, we will analyze the effect of ownership structure on the patent 
applications of Japanese start-up firms, focusing particularly on shareholding by 
VC.  And,  we  will  conclude  whether  shareholding  by  VC  is  supposed  to  have  a 
positive  effect  on  the  patent  applications  of  start-up  firms  brought  by  R&D 
expenditures. 
  The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
effects of ownership structure on the patents of start-up firms. Section 3 explains 
the estimation model. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results and their implications. Finally, section 6 concludes the thesis, presenting 
certain limitations of this study and discussing the scope for further research.   
 
2.    Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
Owing to the fact that patents are the property rights to potential inventions, a 
firm’s patent-taking ability signals the extent of the firm’s underlying technological 
capabilities, and therefore, the firm’s ability to patent new technologies is important   5 
for the firms.   
Lerner  (1994)  examines  the  relationship  between  the  stock  of  intellectual 
property and the valuation of firms, and observes that the holder of a patent on a 
single  product  can  protect  intellectual  property  and  set  a  monopoly  price. 
Consequently, patent application has an economically and statistically significant 
impact on the valuation of such firms.   
In firms where innovation is one of the significant bases of competition, if a 
firm holds many patents, it implies that the firm has the ability to create future 
advancements and to capitalize on external scientific developments that may be 
relevant to the firm’s profit (Kogut and Zander, 1996).   
Austin (1993) shows that the extent of patents applications may determine the 
future structure of a market; new patent application can increase firm’s market 
valuations.   
In the analysis of Mouritsen and Koleva (2005), the argument proposed is that 
patents  are  the  most  important  part  of  a  firm’s  intellectual  capital  and  can  be 
regarded as a form of valuable organizational capital. Further, patent applications 
are  positively  related  to  the  market  valuation  of  firms.  Moreover,  firms  that 
announce  technological  information  with  regard  to  intangibles  often  include 
information on their patent.   
There  are  a  few  previous  studies  on  the  relationship  between  VC  and  the 
innovative output of firms. For example, Kortum and Lerner (2000) investigate the 
influence  of  VC  on  patented  innovation  in  American  firms.  They  argue  that 
VC-backed  firms  have  an  incentive  to  patent  in  order  to  protect  the  embodied   6 
technological knowledge against leakage and to increase the marginal worth of such 
knowledge.  Further,  they  observe  that  entrepreneurial,  human-capital  intensive 
ventures  generate  higher  levels  of  patenting  output  than  established  firms. 
Therefore, VC are positively associated with a substantial increase in patenting.   
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  research  of  Hellmann  and  Puri  (2000),  it  is 
demonstrated  that  VC  select  firms  with  higher  innovative  output  and  more 
educationally qualified management to fund over a period of time. Therefore, these 
firms are innovative even before VC funding.   
Existing studies of Japanese start-up firms focus on the relationship between 
the patents and the R&D expenditures and technical guidance provided by outside 
research  organizations.  Itou  and  Akashi  (2005)  analyze  the  effect  of  R&D 
expenditures and technical guidance by outside research organizations as well as 
the effect of R&D subsidy on the patents of start-up firms. They argue that start-up 
firms  that  have  higher  R&D  expenditures  and  receive  more  technical  guidance 
produce more patents. However, the study does not analyze the influence of VC on 
patent applications.   
In  addition,  Lynskey  (2004)  explains  positive  and  significant  impact  of  VC 
funding  on  the  number  of  patent  applications  and  new  products  of  Japanese 
start-up firms. However, the analysis does not include R&D expenditures in the 
explanatory  variables.  Though,  in  fact,  R&D  expenditures  is  very  important  to 
patent application.   
Despite the increasing attention to VC, only a few previous studies focus on the 
relationship between shareholding by VC and patent applications. However, we are   7 
unable to find such analysis that shareholding by VC and R&D expenditures is 
together used as explanatory variables to patent application of Japanese start-up 
firms. There previous studies do not compare that VC have an incentive to patent 
applications; still, VC select the firms with higher innovative output. 
Then, because the amount of R&D expenditures of a firm generally has a great 
influence on the number of patent application of the firm, it is necessity that R&D 
expenditures is used as explanatory variables in the analysis of patent applications.   
VC can expect large capital gains from the initial public offering (IPO) of their 
portfolio firms. Thus, they stimulate and promote the patent applications of the 
firms to increase the valuation of firm if this leads to an early and successful IPO. 
Moreover, VC are experienced in managing innovative firms and also possess expert 
knowledge  in  some  technological  fields  and  patent  applications.  Therefore,  they 
may  support  R&D  activity  of  the  firms  and  increase  the  productivity  of  R&D 
expenditures by using their specialized experience and expertise.   
Contrary to the abovementioned studies, we will analyze the effect of VC and 
R&D expenditures on the patent applications of Japanese start-up firms, focusing 
particularly  on  shareholding  by  VC.  Further,  we  will  simultaneously  analyze 
whether VC have not only the incentive but also the power and ability to generate 
higher levels of patenting output of start-up firms. Given the above, we propose the 
following hypotheses.   
 
Hypothesis 1:   
Shareholding  by  VC  is  positively  correlated  with  the  patent  applications  of   8 
start-up firms, even after controlling for R&D expenditures. 
 
Hypothesis 2:     
Shareholding by VC is supposed to have a positive effect on patent applications 
of start-up firms brought by R&D expenditures.   
 
3.  Estimation Strategy   
 
In this thesis, in order to test the hypothesis, we estimate the following model.     
 
Model :   
PAT = f (Ownership Structure, Other Firm-level Factors, Industry Factors).   
 
In this model, the dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the number 
of patent applications that plus one (PAT) and the dummy for patent applications 
(PATD). PATD is the dummy variable for patent applications, which takes on the 
value of one if the firm has at least one patent application in the period 2003-2005 
and  zero  otherwise.  The  explanatory  variables  comprise  factors  of  ownership 
structure as well as other firm-level and industry factors for the years 2002 and 
2003.   
The  definitions  of  the  dependent  as  well  as  explanatory  variables  are 
summarized in Table-1.   
In model, the factors of ownership structure include venture capital dummy   9 
(VCD), shareholding by all VC (VCSH) and shareholding by the lead VC (TOP_VC). 
Other firm-level factors include firm size (natural logarithm of employee numbers), 
natural logarithm of R&D expenditures, and a dummy for the CEO’s educational 
background.   
If innovative firms tend to attract VC as the providers of capital, shareholding 
ratio  by  VC  is  endogenous  and  we  encounter  the  problems  of  simultaneity  and 
reverse causality. In order to avoid these problems, we employ the Tobit Model with 
endogenous regressors (IVTOBIT Model) and the Probit Model with endogenous 
Regressors  (IVPROBIT  Model)  for  the  empirical  analysis.  The  instrumental 
variables are the dummy for the family firm (FAD) and the ratio of 1 to the distance 
of the firms to Tokyo (DIS).   
Further, industry factors are expressed by the industry dummy variables for 
software  development,  food  manufacture,  chemical,  electrical  machinery, 
wholesale-retail,  construction  and  other  industries.  In  order  to  determine  the 
relationship  between  VC  and  patent  applications,  we  consider  other  firm-level 
factors  (dummy  for  the  affiliation  with  other  business  corporations,  firm  size, 
natural logarithm of R&D expenditures, and a dummy for the CEO’s educational 
background) and the industry factors as control variables.   
VCD is the dummy variable for shareholding by VC, which takes on the value 
of one if at least one VC is found to be among the top 10 largest shareholders. 
TOP_VC  is  the  ratio  of  shares  held  by  the  lead  VC  among  the  top  10  largest 
shareholders. VCSH is the ratio of the total shares held by all VC.   
Based on the discussion in model, it can be expected that all these variables   10 
(VCD, TOP_VC and VCSH) will have a positive effect on patent applications. In the 
analysis, these variables are estimated interchangeably. If the coefficients of these 
variables are proved to be positively and statistically significant, Hypothesis 1 is 
considered to be supported.   
With regard to other firm-level factors, the following variables are used in the 
estimation model. RDE is the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures. According to 
the hypothesis proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) and Evenson (1993), the number 
of patent applications increases with an increase in R&D expenditures; hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that firms with higher R&D expenditures will apply for more 
patents. Therefore, in this thesis, we control for the R&D expenditures of a firm. If 
the coefficients of these variables (RDE) are proved to be positively and statistically 
significant, it shows that firms with higher R&D expenditures are supposed to be 
more innovative and have more patent applications.   
In addition, the intersection of VCD and RDE (VCD*RDE) is used to ascertain 
whether shareholding by VC is supposed to have an increasing effect on patent 
applications of start-up firms brought by R&D expenditures. VC are experienced in 
managing  innovative  firms  and  also  possessing  expert  knowledge  in  some 
technological  fields  and  patent  applications.  Therefore,  they  may  support  R&D 
activity of the firms and increase the productivity of R&D expenditures by using 
their  specialized  experience  and  expertise.  If  the  coefficient  of  VCD*RDE  has 
positive and significant value, shareholding by VC is supposed to have a positive 
effect  on  patent  applications  of  start-up  firms  brought  by  R&D  expenditures. 
Hypothesis 2 is considered to be supported.   11 
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of employees and is 
used as a proxy for firm size. According to the Schumpeterian Hypothesis, the larger 
firms  have  higher  R&D  expenditures.  This  is  because  in  comparison  to  smaller 
firms, larger firms have more internal funds, more opportunities to procure external 
funds, a higher ability to take risks, and more complementary resources (production, 
marketing, etc.) for implementing innovation. Therefore, we have to control for the 
effect of firm size.   
UNIV is a variable that is used as a proxy for the educational background of 
the firm’s CEO. We argue that the educational level of the CEO may influence the 
technological orientation and innovativeness of a firm (Okamuro, 2006), thereby 
influencing the patent applications of start-up firms, and operating the selection of 
a firm by VC. The dummy variable (UNIV) takes on the value of one if the current 
CEO of the firm is a university graduate and zero otherwise.   
As  mentioned  before,  industry  factors  are  represented  by  industry  dummy 
variables. It is well known that patent applications are higher in chemical industry 
and electrical machinery industries than software development, foods manufacture, 
construction and wholesale-retail industries, and this tendency is supported by our 
data.  Therefore,  we  include  dummy  variables  for  these  industries  (software 
development  industry  dummy:  D1,  foods  manufacture  industry  dummy:  D2, 
chemical  industry  dummy:  D3,  electrical  machinery  industry  dummy:  D4, 
construction  industry  dummy:  D5,  wholesale-retail  industry  dummy:  D6)  in  the 
estimation model.   
Here, we use the ratio of 1 to the distance of the firms to Tokyo (DIS) and the   12 
dummy for family firm (FAD) as the instrumental variables.   
The first instrumental variable is the ratio of shares held by the family firm 
(FA). Using this variable, we will control for the difference between the non-family 
firms  and  the  family  firms.  For  the  family  firm,  because  the  problem  of 
informational asymmetry is particularly serious, and the firms have little network, 
they have little chance to get outside support. Therefore, it will become difficult that 
the family firms can get support of VC. 
Another instrumental variable is the ratio of 1 to the distance of the firms to 
Tokyo (DIS).    If the distance of the firms to Tokyo is far, it will become difficult that 
VC can support and lead the managers of portfolio firms by using their specialized 
experience and expertise, and it will become difficult that VC can efficiently monitor 
the manager. Therefore, it has little possibility that VC select the firms to invest. 
We use the ratio of 1 to the distance of the firms to Tokyo (DIS) as an instrumental 
variable, since many VC are located in Tokyo (there are 51 firms that is held by VC 
in the sample, 44 firms of those firms are in Tokyo). 
 
4.    Data Description 
 
The sample used in this thesis is comprised of 782 small start-up firms; these 
firms  are  selected  from  among  the  software  development,  manufacturing, 
construction,  wholesale,  retail  and  other  (excluding  food  and  other  service) 
industries in Japan that are incorporated between 1990 and 1999, and for which the   13 
R&D  expenditure  data  is  available1.  Data  pertaining  to  factors  of  ownership 
structure  and  other  firm-level  factors  are  obtained  from  the  COSMOS  company 
database of Teikoku Databank—a major credit research institute in Japan—for the 
fiscal year 2002 or 20032.     
In this thesis, start-up firms are defined as the firms that are incorporated less 
than 12 or 13 years ago, as of 2003. We attained the data of 1,040 young firms with 
R&D expenditures from Teikoku Databank. 130 firms in the initial sample of 1,040 
firms belong to the restaurant and other service industries that have few patent 
applications, it is not included in the analysis.    910 firms belong to the software 
development, manufacturing, construction, wholesale, retail and other industries, 
the firms include listed corporations (11 firms), large firms with more than 300 
employees (5 firms)3, firms with missing values (72 firms) and other firms that can 
not investigate patent applications of the firms (40 firms), and these firms (128 
firms)  are  not  included  in  the  analysis.  Further,  the  patent  application  data  is 
obtained  from  the  Japanese  Patent  Office’s  electronic  patent  library  (available 
online) by using the names of the firms. The patent data include the number of 
patent applications in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005.   
The dataset used in this thesis is unique. On the one hand, it includes only 
small and unlisted start-up firms and combines financial and ownership data. In 
other words, the dataset contains (1) R&D expenditures; (2) ownership data such as 
                                                   
1: With regard to the sample firms, since the date of establishment (foundation) was not available, we 
used the date of incorporation as the criterion for sample selection. Accordingly, our sample included 
firms that may have been established before 1990, but were incorporated only after 1990. 
2: The latest available data were for the fiscal year 2002 or 2003, depending on the different dates of 
the financial statements and the investigation conducted by Teikoku Databank.   
3: In the analysis, we determine that the firms having less than 300 employees are small and medium 
enterprises.   14 
the names of large shareholders and the number of shares held by them; and (3) 
other data such as the number of employees, the address, the industry classification 
code, and the educational background of the CEO.   
On the other hand, we are unable to calculate the precise ratio of shareholding 
by  each  large  shareholder;  this  is  because  the  dataset  used  in  this  thesis  only 
contains  information  pertaining  to  the  number  of  shares  held  by  the  top  15 
shareholders, and not the total number of shares. Nevertheless, for a majority of 
start-up  firms,  the  number  of  shareholders  does  not  exceed  15.  These  variables 
should be regarded as proxies.   
Sample  statistics  are  presented  in  Table-2.  In  the  period  2003–2005,  the 
maximum  value  of  the  natural  logarithm  of  patent  applications  was  1.63;  the 
minimum  is  0.  The  mean  value  is  0.101.  There  are  641  firms  with  0  patent 
applications and 141 firms with one or more patent application.   
Further, 5.63% of the sample firms are funded by VC. Accordingly, the average 
values of VCSH are very small because they were calculated including non-VC- 
backed firms. Approximately 37.47% of the CEOs are university graduates.   
The correlation matrix is presented in Table-3.   
 
5.    Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We employ the Tobit Model with endogenous regressors (IVTOBIT Model) and 
the Probit Model with endogenous Regressors (IVPROBIT Model) for the empirical 
analysis.  The  empirical  results  of  the  instrumental  variable  estimation  are   15 
presented in Table-4 and Table-5 . We analyze the results of the Tobit Model with 
endogenous  regressors  (IVTOBIT  Model)  in  this  thesis.  The  variables  of  VC 
shareholding  (VCD,  TOP_VC  and  VCSH)  are  included  interchangeably  in  the 
estimation. Further, the industry dummy variables, namely, software development, 
food manufacture, chemical, electrical machinery, construction and wholesale- retail 
industries are included in all the models. With regard to the estimated value of the 
variables  pertaining to  ownership structure, the  variables  concerning  VC  (VCD, 
TOP_VC  and  VCSH)  display  positively  significant  coefficients  in  the  analysis. 
Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the results. These results suggest that VC have 
a significant positive effect on the patent applications of start-up firms.         
The dummy for the affiliation with other business corporations (SUBS) does not 
show positively significant values. Therefore, it suggests that SUBS    do not have a 
significant positive effect on the patent applications of start-up firms.         
The variable RDE (natural logarithm of R&D expenditures) shows positively 
significant values in the models. Therefore, we conclude that the number of patents 
increases with an increase in R&D expenditures.   
In  addition,  as  the  coefficients  of  VCD*RDE  have  positive  and  significant 
values,  shareholding  by  VC  is  supposed  to  have  an  increasing  effect  on  patent 
applications  of  start-up  firms  brought  by  R&D  expenditures.  Hypothesis  2  is 
supported by the results.   
Moreover, the coefficients of UNIV (educational background of the CEO) are not 
positively  significant  in  the  analysis.  Hence,  we  confirm  that  the  educational 
background of a CEO of a firm does not have a positive significant impact.     16 
Furthermore,  the  coefficients  of  SIZE  (natural  logarithm  of  the  number  of 
employees) are positively significant in these models. It shows that the larger firms 
have more patent applications.   
In this thesis, the estimated results of the industry dummy variables have not 
been presented in a table. The coefficient of electrical machinery industry dummy is 
positively significant. The coefficients of other industry dummies are not positively 
significant.  This  suggests  that  the  electrical  machinery  industry  in  particular 
affects patent applications.   
The  empirical  results  demonstrate  that  shareholding  by  VC  has  a  positive 
impact on the patent applications of Japanese start-up firms. Further, it is shown 
that VC have an incentive to patent in order to increase firm’s market valuations. 
Also, it is found that start-up firms that have higher R&D expenditures produce 
more patents. We observe the same tendency in the Probit Model with endogenous 
Regressors (IVPROBIT Model) for the empirical analysis. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this thesis, the effects of ownership structure on the patent applications of 
start-up firms were examined, focusing particularly on the role of VC. A unique 
dataset of Japanese start-up firms was used in the analysis, controlling for firm and 
industry  characteristics.  We  found  that  shareholding  by  VC  had  a  positively 
significant  impact  on  patent  applications  and  VC  was  supposed  to  have  an 
increasing effect on patent applications of the firms brought by R&D expenditures.     17 
The  main  conclusion  of  this  study  is  that  VC  actively  affect  the  patent 
applications  of  start-up  firms  and  their  innovations.  In  other  previous  studies, 
research on the patent applications of firms was conducted focusing primarily on 
R&D expenditures or VC funds. However, few studies have been conducted on the 
relationship  between  ownership  structure  and  the  patent  applications  of  firms, 
particularly start-up firms. Moreover, few previous studies have focused on whether 
shareholding by VC is supposed to have a positive effect on patent applications of 
start-up firms brought by R&D expenditures. Through this study, we attempted to 
bridge this gap. The empirical results supported our hypotheses.   
Nevertheless, there are certain limitations in this study. Since the sample of 
this thesis included only start-up firms that have R&D expenditures, the estimated 
results had the limitation of being generalized to all start-up firms.   
In  conclusion,  there  have  been  few  empirical  studies  on  the  relationship 
between ownership structure and the patent applications of start-up firms. With 
respect to the role of VC, this thesis can be regarded as the first attempt toward 
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Table-1 Table-1 Table-1 Table-1：　 ：　 ：　 ：　Definitions of Variables Definitions of Variables Definitions of Variables Definitions of Variables
  Dependent variables   Dependent variables   Dependent variables   Dependent variables
  Natural logarithm of numberｓ of  patent applications (PAT)
  Dummy for patent applications (PATD)
  Explanatory variables    Explanatory variables    Explanatory variables    Explanatory variables 
  Venture capital dummy (VCD)
  Ownership Structure/   Shareholding ratio by lead venture capitalists (TOP_VC)
    Governance Factors
  Shareholding ratio by all venture capitalists (VCSH)
   Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures (RDE)
  Intersection of VCD and RDE (VCD*RDE)
  Firm-level Factors
  Dummy for CEO's educational background (UNIV)
  Natural logarithm of employee number (SIZE)
  Software industry dummy (D1)
  Foods manufacture industry dummy (D2)
 Chemical industry dummy (D3)
  Industry Factors
  Electrical machinery industry dummy (D4)
  Construction industry dummy (D5)
  Wholesale-Retail industry dummy (D6)
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 Table  Table  Table  Table-2： -2： -2： -2：  Descriptive Statistics   Descriptive Statistics   Descriptive Statistics   Descriptive Statistics
　　　　　Nｕｍｂｅｒ of observations (782)
Variables  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median
PAT 0.101 0.251 0 1.63 0
PATD 0.180 0.385 0 1 0
VCD 0.0563 0.231 0 1 0
TOP_VC 0.00805 0.0405 0 0.459 0
VCSH 0.0155 0.0762 0 0.875 0
RDE -0.806 1.90 -6.91 5.97 -0.813
VCD*RDE 0.0834 0.602 -3.47 5.97 0
UNIV 0.375 0.484 0 1 0
SIZE 2.41 1.12 0 5.69 2.40
D1 0.0703 0.256 0 1 0
D2 0.0394 0.195 0 1 0
D3 0.0128 0.112 0 1 0
D4 0.0396 0.195 0 1 0
D5 0.350 0.477 0 1 0
D6 0.331 0.471 0 1 0
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                               Table                                Table                                Table                                Table-4 -4 -4 -4： ： ： ： Estimation Results  Estimation Results  Estimation Results  Estimation Results
                                    Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors) 
                                       Dependent variable
Natural logarithm of numberｓ of  patent applications (PAT) (2003-2005)
Explanatory variables  ① ② ③ ④
VCD 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656
(2.23)b (2.23)b (2.23)b (2.23)b (3.30)a (3.30)a (3.30)a (3.30)a
TOP_VC 6.73 6.73 6.73 6.73
(2.30)b (2.30)b (2.30)b (2.30)b
VCSH 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55
(2.31)b (2.31)b (2.31)b (2.31)b
RDE 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
(1.76)c (1.76)c (1.76)c (1.76)c (1.67)c (1.67)c (1.67)c (1.67)c (2.37)b (2.37)b (2.37)b (2.37)b (4.44)a (4.44)a (4.44)a (4.44)a
VCD*RDE 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247
(2.91)a (2.91)a (2.91)a (2.91)a
UNIV 0.0298 0.0356 0.0582 0.469
(0.32) (0.38) (0.64) (0.58)
SIZE 0.289 0.294 0.267 0.284
(2.90)a (2.93)a (2.66)b (7.59)a
Constant -1.13 -1.13 -1.10 -1.11
(-5.72)a (-5.71)a (-5.67)a (-14.6)a
Log likelihood 1131 642 -177 -76.7
Number of observations 782 782 782 782
 1) The level of significance: a 1%, b 5%, c 10%.
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                               Table                                Table                                Table                                Table-5 -5 -5 -5： ： ： ： Estimation Results  Estimation Results  Estimation Results  Estimation Results
                                    Method of Estimation: IVPROBIT (Probit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVPROBIT (Probit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVPROBIT (Probit Model with Endogenous Regressors)                                      Method of Estimation: IVPROBIT (Probit Model with Endogenous Regressors) 
                                 Dependent variable
Dummy for patent applications (PATD) (2003-2005)
 Explanatory variables  ① ② ③ ④
VCD 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965
(2.66)a (2.66)a (2.66)a (2.66)a (2.28)b (2.28)b (2.28)b (2.28)b
TOP_VC 9.77 9.77 9.77 9.77
(2.88)a (2.88)a (2.88)a (2.88)a
VCSH 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13
(2.85)a (2.85)a (2.85)a (2.85)a
RDE 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115
(1.54) (1.54) (1.54) (1.54) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) (2.15)b (2.15)b (2.15)b (2.15)b (1.69)c (1.69)c (1.69)c (1.69)c
VCD*RDE 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825
(1.87)c (1.87)c (1.87)c (1.87)c
UNIV 0.0148 0.0215 0.0518 0.0379
(0.13) (0.18) (0.44) (0.25)
SIZE 0.299 0.309 0.278 0.310
(2.36)b (2.43)b (2.15)b (3.84)a
Constant -1.35 -1.36 -1.34 -1.40
(-6.19)a (-6.19)a (-6.05)a (-2.51)b
Log likelihood 1176 688 -132 -28.2
  Number of observations 782 782 782 782
 1) The level of significance: a 1%, b 5%, c 10%.
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